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Letter to the Editor
We are concerned that statisticians, such as Biedermann
et al. [1], advocate the position that data may not be
needed to support assumptions ‘as long as probability is
properly considered as an expression of personal belief’.
At a time when the National Academy of Sciences [2]
has urged the need for the forensic science community
to provide reliable results based on ‘objective’ data,
these authors’ position cannot be reconciled. The Report
noted (on its page 8), ‘The simple reality is that the
interpretation of forensic evidence is not always based
on scientific studies to determine its validity ... A body
of research is required to establish the limits and mea-
sures of performance and to address the impact of
sources of variability and potential bias. Such research is
sorely needed, but it seems to be lacking in most of the
forensic disciplines that rely on subjective assessments
of matching characteristics. These disciplines need to
develop rigorous protocols to guide these subjective
interpretations and pursue equally rigorous research and
evaluation programs’. It is this approach that distin-
guishes science from other epistemologies. Then the
Report called for research in its Recommendation 3
(page 23), ‘Research is needed to address issues of accu-
racy, reliability, and validity in the forensic science disci-
plines ... [and in section c of Recommendation 3] the
development of quantifiable measures of uncertainty in
the conclusions of forensic analyses’.
Foremost, none should abide the inclusion of over-
stated evidence in reports or legal proceedings as it can
impinge on the presumption of innocence. The tenet of
this presumption should be held dearly by all, and we as
scientists should strive to reduce practices that cannot
be supported. Biedermann et al. [1] appear to argue
that, because there is ‘subjectivity in science’,o n ed o e s
not necessarily have to be held to a standard of justify-
ing assumptions. It is well accepted that there is subjec-
tivity in science. Indeed, Budowle et al. [3] and others
(see references in [3]) have discussed the inherent sub-
jectivity that exists. It may never be possible to remove
all subjectivity, and for that reason we should attempt to
develop and agree upon guidelines (or rules) about
methods to minimize faulty generalizations. The asser-
tion of Biedermann et al. [1] that we do ‘not require
new guidelines edited by the forensic DNA community’
is a formula for continued misapplication. Scientists
endeavor to identify the subjectivities and the conse-
quences that might shape or misdirect our conclusions.
Our use of the term objectivity [4] is clear in context.
Data should support the prior probabilities that are
employed. In this regard, we maintain our position.
Budowle et al. [4] described the Collins case [5],
which held that the courts are concerned about the
assumptions made by scientists being justified with
actual data that support them. Oddly, Biedermann et al.
stated ‘it remains questionable whether scientists should
interfere with a topic of which practicing legal decision
makers are already well aware and that, above all, they
are in a better position to appreciate’ and cite the case
State of New Jersey versus Spann [6]. Biedermann et al.
have misunderstood the decisions in the Spann and Col-
lins cases. These cases fully support our call for an
empirical basis for assumptions and that untethered use
of personal belief is not acceptable. The court is calling
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not usurp the responsibility of the jury. Courts typically
do not prescribe science to scientists; they demand that
the scientists support their conclusions with data. Perso-
nal beliefs alone are not a sufficient basis for entering
scientific evidence into legal proceedings. However, in
contrast to the misunderstandings of Biedermann et al.,
the Courts in Collins and Spann have prescribed what is
not scientifically acceptable.
Contrary to the position promoted by Biedermann et
al. [1], we advocate that conclusions by scientists be
supported with data. For too long the human identity
community has avoided addressing the issue of generat-
ing prior probabilities in missing persons identification
cases. Indeed, in a number of cases, inflated values have
been proffered. We reiterate that none of us should
abide overstated evidence being presented in legal pro-
ceedings or being placed in reports. Our position
remains that guidelines are needed so that the triers of
fact can use better informed judgment. At the least the
legal community can be better educated on the pitfalls
wherein scientists may become trapped to ensure the
presumption of innocence is protected and justice is
served.
It is worth noting that Jackson et al. [7], of which one
of the authors is prominently cited by Biedermann et al.
[1] to support their opinion in their letter, opined that
‘This information and knowledge may provide a valid,
robust assessment of the priors but there is a risk of the
scientist being swayed by unreliable or limited prior
information, from witnesses for example, towards an
erroneous high prior for one hypothesis’ and ‘We
believe that any expression of posterior probabilities,
without making clear the priors, and the information on
which the priors were based, runs a serious risk of pro-
viding misleading opinion’. Perhaps Biedermann et al.
missed these concerns when reviewing the literature.
Acknowledgements
We would like thank Mr Rockne Harmon for his input.
Author details
1Institute of Applied Genetics, University of North Texas Health Science
Center, Fort Worth, TX, USA.
2Department of Forensic and Investigative
Genetics, University of North Texas Health Science Center, Fort Worth, TX,
USA.
3Department of Biological Sciences, University of North Texas, Denton,
TX, USA.
Authors’ contributions
BB was responsible for drafting the response. JG, RC, and HG-K contributed
to the response and provided edits. All authors read and approved the final
reply.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 9 January 2012 Accepted: 1 February 2012
Published: 1 February 2012
References
1. Biedermann A, Taroni F, Margot P: Reply to Budowle, Ge, Chakraborty and
Gill-King: Use of prior odds for missing persons identifcations. Investig
Genet , (submitted).
2. National Research Council Report: Strengthening Forensic Science in the
United States: A Path Forward. Washington, DC: National Academies Press;
2009.
3. Budowle B, Bottrell MC, Bunch SG, Fram R, Harrison D, Meagher S, Oien CT,
Peterson PE, Seiger DP, Smith MB, Smrz MA, Solti GL, Stacey RB: A
perspective on errors, bias, and interpretation in the forensic sciences
and direction for continuing advancement. J Forens Sci 2009, 54:798-809.
4. Budowle B, Ge J, Chakraborty R, Gill-King H: Use of prior odds for missing
persons identifications. Investig Genet 2011, 2:1-6.
5. People v Collins 1968, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497. http://
www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/sklansky/evidence/evidence/cases/Cases%
20for%20TOA/People%20v.%20Collins.htm.
6. State of New Jersey v Spann 1993, 617 A.2d 247.
7. Jackson G, Jones S, Booth G, Champod C, Evett IW: The nature of forensic
science opinion–a possible framework to guide thinking and practice in
investigations and in court proceedings. Sci Justice 2006, 46(1):33-44.
doi:10.1186/2041-2223-3-3
Cite this article as: Budowle et al.: Response to: Use of prior odds for
missing persons identifications - authors’ reply. Investigative Genetics
2012 3:3.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Budowle et al. Investigative Genetics 2012, 3:3
http://www.investigativegenetics.com/content/3/1/3
Page 2 of 2